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Few legal events have had as much impact on day-to-day busi-
ness as the rulings of California courts in the 1980's regarding em-
ployment law. Most California employers, including those in the
Silicon Valley, are now acutely aware that "wrongfully" discharged
employees have gained access to a wide range of rights and remedies
not previously available. The long assumed right of employers to
run their businesses, hiring and firing employees as they choose,
"whatever be [their] reason, good, bad, or indifferent,"1 has become
virtually obsolete. It is the preservation of that right, modified in
recognition of newly affirmed employee protections, that is the goal
of this article.
Of primary concern to employers who are intent upon protect-
ing their prerogatives is the drafting and negotiating of employment
contract provisions that make risk-free termination possible. Sec-
ond, employers can take advantage of the growing body of case law
which discusses what constitutes good cause for termination. Em-
ployers can use that knowledge at the time of termination to assess
whether the requirements for "good cause" have been met. Fi-
nally, employers can follow up the termination of an employee with
a release agreement that closes the door on future litigation.
This article focuses on using the above methods to discourage
claims entirely and, in the event of lawsuits, successfully defeat
them at an early stage of litigation by demurrer or summary judg-
ment, thus avoiding a jury trial. While the arsenal for employers to
ward off employment claims remains limited, the employer is by no
* Hopkins & Carley, a law corporation. J.D. Santa Clara University 1976, (magna
cum laude); B.A. U.C.L.A. 1968 (Phi Beta Kappa).
1. "Precisely as may the employee cease labor at his whim or pleasure, and, whatever
be his reason, good, bad, or indifferent, leave no one a legal right to complain; so upon the
other hand, may the employer discharge, and, whatever be his reason, good, bad, or indiffer-
ent, no one has suffered a legal wrong." Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lum-
ber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 554, 112 P.2d 886 (1910). See also, Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal.
App. 2d 63, 65-66, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967).
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means defenseless. In fact, the employer may wish to consider its
own cross-complaint against the non-performing employee to re-
cover damages suffered by the company as a result of the poor per-
formance. This last recourse is addressed here because an employer
may often wish to take the offensive when faced with a claim from a
sales representative who did not sell or from an executive who did
not manage.
II. CURRENT CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE
EMPLOYER'S PERSPECTIVE
California Labor Code § 2922 provides that employment
which is not for a stated length of time can be terminated "at the
will" of either party.2 But an employer's reliance on this doctrine at
face value is ill-advised because of the many exceptions to the rule
which have been recently recognized by the courts. Section 2922
has been said to create only a presumption of at-will employment.
The presumption can now be overcome by discharged employees
who are able to show the existence of an exception arising (1) from
another statute, (2) from public policy, or (3) from contract. Where
a discharge falls within any of these exceptions, the employer faces
liability for wrongful termination.
The first exception limiting at-will discharge, that of statute,
has long existed at federal, state, and local levels. This exception
prohibits discriminatory, unsafe, or otherwise unsavory employer
practices and discharges related to those practices.3 The second ex-
ception, which is becoming increasingly recognized in the courts,
exists where an employee discharge violates an express statutory ob-
jective or undermines a firmly established principle of public pol-
icy;4 such discharges might be said to violate the spirit rather than
the letter of the law. The "growth" area in employment law, and
the third exception to at will discharges, has been that of contract.
Recognition in the employment arena of implied contracts and cov-
enants of good faith and fair dealing associated with them, has re-
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (Deering 1976).
3. For example, anti-discrimination laws found in Title VII, Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964); age discrimination statutes such as in CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 12941-12942 (Deering 1988 Supp.); and local statutes such as those in San Francisco
prohibiting discharge because of sexual orientation. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. POLICE CODE,
art. 33 (1981).
4. The public policy exception is described in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
Cal. 3d 167, 172, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980), where the plaintiff alleged his
discharge resulted from his refusal to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme. See also




suited in the most dramatic recent changes in employer-employee
relations.
The expansion of employee rights has been matched by a simi-
lar expansion in the remedies available to employees. These reme-
dies include not only contract-type damages for lost wages, but tort
and punitive damages as well. Punitive damages are recoverable for
discharges in violation of public policy,5 or in violation of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (found to exist in em-
ployment relationships).6 They are also available for infliction of
emotional distress in the discharge process when the employer's
conduct is "extreme and outrageous, having a severe and traumatic
effect upon plaintiff's emotional tranquility."7
Various studies have quantified the risks employers face in dis-
charges. One such study found that 62 wrongful discharge cases in
1987 proceeded to a jury trial in California. Of those, 61% resulted
in favorable jury verdicts or trial settlements for plaintiffs, with
awards averaging $482,697;8 the average excludes one $17.5 million
decision. Of course, the number of cases which actually go to trial
represents only a fraction of the hundreds of wrongful discharge
cases filed but disposed of before trial. Some potential limitation of
large damages awards may be obtained from recent legislation
which has redefined the "oppression" necessary for an award of pu-
nitive damages. To show oppression, the plaintiff must now prove
"despicable conduct,"9 a harsher standard that may be difficult to
meet. Nonetheless, the prospect of punitive damages, usually an
unknown, and invariably in large amounts, is a serious considera-
tion for an employer. An employer must weigh this consideration
against the advisability of a discharge or of a settlement with a com-
plaining employee.
5. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610
P.2d 1330 (1980), making compensatory and punitive damages available in public policy
cases.
6. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
7. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P. 2d
216 (1970). While emotional distress claims broaden potential damages recovery and open
the door to punitive damages, they are a type of personal injury claim and thus may introduce
the possibility of insurance coverage, at least for defense costs (recently limited), by the em-
ployer's general liability carrier, a worker's compensation carrier, and/or a carrier of director
and officer liability insurance.
8. San Jose Mercury News, February 9, 1988, 9E, col. 1-4, citing a study by a San
Fransisco law firm.
9. Chapter 1498, of the California Statutes of 1987, effective September, 1987, which
amends Civ. CODE § 3294. This amendment further strengthens the standard of proof for
punitive damages by requiring that the defendant be found guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice "by clear and convincing evidence."
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Within the three areas of exception to at-will employment
(statute, public policy, and contract), employers can exercise vary-
ing levels of "risk control" to limit litigation. With respect to em-
ployee claims arising from a violation of statute or public policy,
most employers can reduce the risk of litigation by engaging in good
business practices.
The most serious challenges to risk control that an employer
may face are allegations of breach of employment contracts. These
are not written contracts in which the terms are spelled out, but
rather are implied and oral employment contracts found by courts
to exist in many employment relationships.
The now established theory of implied contract did not gain
prominence in employment cases until the 1981 case of Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc. 10 The court in this case found that numerous
circumstances common in employer-employee relationships may
creat an implied contract obligating the employer not to terminate
the employee without good cause.11 Factors giving rise to an im-
plied contract include longevity of service, commendations and pro-
motions, the existence of personnel practices and policies oriented
to fairness, and assurances of continued employment. Such a con-
tract then overcomes the statutory presumption that the employer
may terminate for any reason, commonly referred to as termination
"at will."
Pugh, involving an employee who had worked 32 years for the
same company, and other cases12 suggest that lengthy employment
may be essential to a wrongful discharge claim. Nonetheless, other
cases have permitted such claims by employees of short duration. 13
10. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). The court held that employ-
ees can establish an implied contract for continuing employment unless good cause for dis-
charge exists: "there is no analytical reason why an employee's promise to render services, or
his actual rendition of services over time, may not support an employer's promise ... to
refrain from arbitrary dismissal." 116 Cal. App. 3d at 325-26. See also Walker v. Northern
San Diego County Hosp. District, 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 905, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
11. Id.
12. "[IThe longevity of the employee's service [in this case 18 years], together with the
expressed policy of the employer, operate as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of
such an employee by the employer without good cause." Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). In Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty
Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467,478, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984), the court noted the failure of
the plaintiff, with only three and a half years employment, to show the longevity factor.
13. In Khanna v. Microdata Corp. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985),
Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 821, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986), and Koehrer
v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986), longevity was not
viewed as critical. In Khanna, the court found for an employee of 30 months' tenure, stating
that the "theory of recovery articulated in Cleary is not dependent on the particular factors
[Vol. 4
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Whatever the state of the matter in the appellate courts, employees
in Silicon Valley with tenure of a few years or less have not been
discouraged from filing claims."4 Indeed, given practices in the
high-tech industry, two years of employment may well be viewed as
long term by a local jury.
Bolstering employee claims of implied contracts are claims of
oral contracts. These claims are based on employer statements that
employment will continue as long as their work is satisfactory, or
that future employment with the company is secure. The employee
relying upon a breach of oral contract claim may need to withstand
a legal challenge that such an oral contract is barred by the Statute
of Frauds in view of the absence of a writing.15 This issue is cur-
rently being addressed by the California Supreme Court, 16 and a
ruling is expected shortly.
Oral contracts made by careless managers hoping to "sell" a
recruit, are difficult to control. Contracts that imply that termina-
tion will be only for good cause are even more difficult to control
because they arise from events that comprise the very nature of the
employment relationship. Such contracts are easily alleged by em-
ployees and often serve as the "hook" on which the employee termi-
nated for poor performance hangs a claim which has scant legal
indentified in that case." 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262. Gray involved employment of fourteen
months, Koehrer-four months.
14. A sample review of the case roles in Santa Clara County for a period of nine court
days in 1987, September 22 through October 2, revealed the filing of six cases (out of 158 total
cases filed in that period) which were denominated complaints for wrongful termination. In
these cases, minimal tenure of employment did not deter several complaining employees,
whose "longevity" was 1-1/2 months, 9 months, 2 years, 2-1/2 years, 3-1/2 years and 15-1/2
years. Whether these cases can withstand legal challenges before reaching a jury is of course
unknown at this stage, but the employer is nonetheless forced to litigate once the complaint is
filed.
15. An oral employment agreement that by its terms cannot be performed within one
year is barred by the Statute of Frauds, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a) (Deering 1987 Supp.) In
Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 446, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984),
the court, finding "a reasonable expectation of employment for more than one year" held that
the Statute of Frauds barred an oral agreement. A recent Ninth Circuit federal case, how-
ever, found that the Statute of Frauds does not bar wrongful discharge based on a partially
oral and partially implied contract; the rule of Newfield is not representative of California law
and accordingly holds that if an oral agreement is capable of being performed within a year, it
is not within the confines of the statute of frauds. Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of North America,
815 F.2d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 1987).
16. This issue is presently before the California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 28, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985) (rev. granted, Jan. 30, 1986, LA
32148); Santa Monica Hosp. v. Super. Ct, 182 Cal. App. 3d 878 (1985) (rev. granted, Jan. 16,
1986, LA 32143), reprinted without change at 192 Cal. App. 3d 127, and Miller v. Indasco
Inc., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1336, 223 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1986) (rev. granted, June 20, 1986, LA
32204).
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grounds. The employer is then forced to defend the grounds for
termination, prove good cause, and possibly face second guessing by
a jury of "employees."
Can an employer take charge of the inevitable scenario wherein
an employee is fired from his job, files a lawsuit and wins a judg-
ment over the employer? California's new and more conservative
Supreme Court may assist employers in the future, but employers
need not wait for judicial guidelines to adopt specific procedures to
minimize risk of legal claims from employees discharged for poor
performance.
III. IS A CROSS-COMPLAINT AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE A
VIABLE PURSUIT FOR THE EMPLOYER FACED WITH A
WRONGFUL TERMINATION LAWSUIT?
This question is frequently asked by employers sued for wrong-
ful termination. The matter stems from the employer's mistaken
belief that the poorly performing employee could possibly be enti-
tled to damages without an offsetting award to the employer for
losses caused by the employee. The employer stance is that em-
ployee misfeasance is the cause for numerous company problems.
The lack of California case law addressing cross-complaints by
an employer when an employee has filed a wrongful termination
suit indicates that this option has rarely been pursued, if at all.
Apart from abundant tactical considerations, there appears to be no
reason why an employer cannot sue an employee for failing to ade-
quately perform the job, even though the employee's conduct does
not amount to criminal or fraudulent wrongdoing.17 Statutes under
which an employee can be held liable for inadequate job perform-
ance are found in the Labor Code:
An employee is bound to exercise a reasonable degree of skill,
unless his employer has notice, before employing him, of his
want of skill.18
An employee is always bound to use such skills as he possesses,
so far as the same is required, for the service specified. 19
An employee who is guilty of a culpable degree of negligence is
17. An employer may also, of course, sue an employee for indemnity when that em-
ployee has committed a particularly egregious act, such as an unauthorized tort against a
third party. In Walsh v. Hooker and Fay, 212 Cal. App. 2d 450, 462, 28 Cal. Rptr. 16
(1963), the court stated: "the law is well settled that when a judgment has been rendered
against an employer or principal for damages occassioned by the unauthorized tortious act of
his employee or agent, the former may recoup his loss in an action against the latter."
18. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2858 (Deering 1976).
19. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2859 (Deering 1976).
234 [Vol. 4
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liable to his employer for the damage thereby caused to the em-
ployer. The employer is liable to the employee if the service is
not gratuitous, for the value of the services only as are properly
rendered.20
These sections and the case law interpreting them provide little
help in determining precisely what type of employee action or inac-
tion would be necessary for that employee to be held liable to the
employer. Courts have served notice to the lack of precedent on the
issues as to whether simple negligence of an employee gives rise to a
cause of action by the employer and what constitutes the "culpable
degree of negligence" referred to in the Labor Code. They have
nonetheless indicated that a cause of action for negligence against
the employee is possible.21
One court has interpreted the standard of the Labor Code to
mean that an employee is guilty of a culpable degree of negligence
when he is hired for pay and fails to use ordinary care; gross negli-
gence is the standard only where the employee is a volunteer, a
"gratuitous" employee.22 Another court followed the Restatement
of Agency, § 380, and opined that it is implied in every contract of
employment "that the employee will conduct himself with such de-
cency and propriety as not to injure the employer in his business. 23
Ironically, a corporation which sues its employee may be re-
quired under the California Corporations Code to indemnify the
employee for expenses incurred in the defense or settlement of the
action against the employee if the employee is deemed to have acted
in good faith.24 In other words, it appears that an employee could
be found negligent, but nonetheless indemnified, if he or she meant
well.
As the law now stands, it seems clear that an employer may file
a cross claim against an employee for negligence. Certain assess-
20. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2865 (Deering 1976).
21. See Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Barnes, 205 Cal. App. 2d 337, 349, 23
Cal. Rptr. 55 (1962), and Dahl-Beck Elec. Co. v. Rogge, 275 Cal. App. 2d 893, 80 Cal. Rptr.
440 (1969). In Barnes, the employer hired Cobb to irrigate its alfalfa. Cobb maliciously and
with intent to defraud insufficiently watered the crop. As a result, a cutting of alfalfa hay
was lost and monetary damage resulted. The Division of Labor Law Enforcement sued the
employer to recover Cobb's wages. The court held that whether the employer was entitled to
interpose a cross-action for culpable negligence would be a question of fact.
22. Dahl-Beck Elec. Co. v. Rogge, 275 Cal. App. 2d at 907.
23. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 944 (1955). Accord, Foley v. U.S. Paving Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 499,
505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1968), where the court stated that "every employment contract in-
cludes a covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the parties."
24. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c) (Deering 1988 Supp.).
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ments should be made first, however, most important of which is
the impact the claim will have on a jury. A strong case of employee
malfeasance will likely serve to defeat the employee's wrongful dis-
charge claim before the jury. Is it worthwhile to risk loss of jurors'
sympathy in the main action with an offensive claim which may
antagonize them? Might not the employer be seen negligent as well,
for failing to supervise the employee properly, or failing to hire with
care, or failing to terminate the employee before damage was
caused? The scope of inquiry may be broader than the employer is
willing to face. For example, is it really the fault of the vice presi-
dent of marketing that sales fell short of target? What about prod-
uct bugs, late arrival to market, or the CEO's failure to authorize
hiring of a sales manager? Blaming a single employee for a com-
pany's problems is a difficult proposition at best.
Thus, while a clear legal impediment may not exist, a claim
against an employee, even one solvent enough to pay a judgment,
should be considered only in unusual circumstances. The law will
not bar the claim, but good sense might.
III. AT TIME OF EMPLOYMENT, CONTROLLING SUBSEQUENT
CONTRACT CLAIMS
A. "'At-will" Disclaimers
The placement of disclaimers in all written materials the em-
ployer presents to the employee specifying that employment is "at
will," is frequently suggested to employers in order to avoid wrong-
ful discharge litigation.25 The disclaimer can be placed in applica-
tion forms, offer letters, confidentiality agreements, stock option
plans, personnel handbooks, and any other materials relevant to the
employment relationship, particularly those acknowledged and
signed by the employee. The disclaimer can then serve to contra-
dict claims by the employee that he or she believed that termination
would only be for good cause.26
25. A sample of such a disclaimer is:
Except for those employees who have written contracts with the company for
employment for a specified period of time, employment is "at-will" employ-
ment, that is, the employment relationship may be terminated at any time with
or without cause, and with or without notice, at the option of either the com-
pany or the employee.
26. In Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisers, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr.
613 (1984), the plaintiff had signed a written stock option and employment agreement which
reserved the company's right to discharge the employee with or without good cause. The
court held that the express contractual provisions created "at will" employment and pre-
vented plaintiff from alleging an implied contract for continued employment. The Shapiro
[Vol. 4
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The problem with this approach lies in its variance with the
actual practices of most employers who generally endeavor to treat
employees fairly, and who do not normally terminate or discipline
employees without cause. Moreover, a true policy of "no cause"
termination may well be counterproductive in the competitive
recruiting environment frequently found for high-tech industry
technical personnel and executives.
High-tech employers, familiar with personnel practices, often
have policies which contradict an assertion that employment is at
will. Such a policy is incorporated by listing specific grounds for
immediate termination or by providing procedures for disciplinary
steps before termination. Moreover, the employer's course of deal-
ing with employees may create similar obligations to treat employ-
ees fairly.
Nevertheless, the "at-will" disclaimer remains the simplest
overall attack on claims of implied employment contracts. So long
as the employer demonstrates consistency with the disclaimer in its
practices, it can serve a useful purpose.
B. Employment Contracts with Termination Provisions
1. Contracts for a Specified Term
If the reported cases, and the experience of company counsel,
are any indication, employers rarely enter formal, written employ-
ment contracts with their employees. To the extent terms of em-
ployment are in writing, they are found in brief offer letters.
Employment contracts have been reserved, apparently, for those
highly desirable executives with whom the employer is willing to
commit to guaranteed employment for a specified period of time.
Such contracts have long had their termination provisions governed
by the strict definition of "cause" set forth in California Labor
Code § 2924 which states:
An employment for a specified term may be terminated at any
time by the employer in case of any willfull breach of duty by the
employee in the course of his employment, or in the case of his
habitual neglect of his duty or continued incapacity to perform
it.2
7
While this statute has not been interpreted in all cases to mean
court recognized long-standing California law which holds that the terms of an express con-
tract supersede those of an implied contract. See Crain v. Burroughs Corp. 560 F. Supp. 849,
852 (C.D.Cal. 1983), and Wal-Noon Corp. v. Hill, 45 Cal. App. 3d 605, 613, 119 Cal. Rptr.
646 (1975).
27. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2924 (Deering 1976).
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that an employer can only terminate a term contract for these three
reasons,28 the standard is a stringent one, and poor performance
without greater dereliction of duty will be insufficient to meet the
standard. Indeed, were that not the case, the employee bargaining
for a guaranteed term of employment would receive nothing more
than employment without such a contract.29
From the employer's perspective, term contracts offer little
flexibility. Even when written to include descriptions of events trig-
gering termination, such events necessarily must be of the caliber
found in Labor Code § 2924 to avoid legal liability for the termina-
tion. Since the employee is much less likely to be bound to the term
of employment than the employer, term contracts are rightfully re-
served for instances where the employee clearly has superior bar-
gaining power.
2. Employment Contracts with no Specified Term
Employment not for a specified term is deemed by the Labor
Code to be at-will employment. Although subject to the judicial
exceptions discussed above, at-will employment is not subject to the
Labor Code definition of cause. Such employment may truly be at
the will of both employer and employee when governed by a con-
tract with specific conditions that the parties themselves have freely
chosen and negotiated.
A valid, express contract addressing the circumstances under
which termination will occur, such as only for good cause, will su-
persede any implied contract that covers the same subject but re-
quires different results.3" Since opportunities for an employer to
imply that the employee will be fairly treated abound in employ-
ment relationships, the courts will often find a contract to exist be-
tween the employer and employee. In the case of a written
contract, the agreement between the parties is visible, and the issue
of termination is addressed squarely rather than obliquely as in an
implied contract. With a written contract, the employer can bar-
28. The court in Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1167, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 820 (1986), noted, "[s]ection 2924... permits termination of an employment contract
by the employerfor cause, even when the contract is for a specified term and the term has not
expired." (Emphasis added.) See also Crillo v. Curtola, 91 Cal. App. 2d 263, 204 P.2d 941
(1949).
29. Good cause in the implied contract context is a less stringent standard than the
standard applicable in determining the propriety of an employee's termination under a con-
tract for a specified term. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (1981).




gain for an acceptable way to handle the termination situation,
without having to meet standards of good cause. Moreover, the em-
ployer can spell out that the contract terms cannot be varied by
anything other than the written agreement of both parties.
Written employment contracts for every employee may appear
to be an overwhelming burden for high-tech employers more con-
cerned with getting the product out the door. However, handling
the termination situation in a negotiated writing before problems
arise can avoid inevitable and time-consuming difficulties at the
time of termination. At the very least, contracts with high-level em-
ployees should be considered. It is with these employees that the
risk of large damage awards stemming from the loss of high wages,
valuable rights such as appreciated stock, and the prestige associ-
ated with the position, are greatest. Moreover, the employer's dem-
onstration of cause and fairness is likely to be more difficult in the
termination of high-level employees. Careful personnel practices
geared to fairness, such as written performance evaluations, discipli-
nary steps and warning periods, are infrequently used with manage-
ment level employees. The Board of Directors or the CEO may
wish to deal most swiftly with these employees in order to ensure
the company's survival. However, speedy termination may appear
unnecessarily harsh to outsiders.
Of course a contract with a management employee can serve
many purposes, including spelling out the employee's bounds of au-
thority, the expectations of the Board of Directors, the benefits and
terms of employment, and even sales goals. However the two par-
ticular provisions discussed below, arbitration clauses and termina-
tion provisions, are aimed at diminishing the possibility of wrongful
discharge litigation.
a. Termination Provisions
In employment termination cases in California, no courts have
directly addressed the issue of whether an employer can provide for
a determination of liquidated damages upon termination in an em-
ployment contract. However, other authority indicates that such a
provision would be upheld. A statutory presumption of validity ex-
ists for liquidated damages provisions in most contracts, unless it
can be shown that the provision was unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances existing at the time the contract was made.3
A severance pay arrangement between employer and employee,
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(b) (Deering 1987 Supp.). See Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 629,
640 (1972); Hecht v. Brandus, 21 N.Y.S. 1034, aff'd 23 N.Y.S. 1004 (1893).
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one type of liquidated damages provision, was recently approved by
a federal district court in California. In Cox v. Resilient Flooring
Division of Congolium Corp.,32 the court found that the severance
pay had been fixed at a level designed to make the employee whole
should he be fired without cause. The court strictly construed the
implied contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing theories and held that the employee was not wrongfully termi-
nated but was sufficiently compensated by the severance pay.33
This pay was not the "two weeks in lieu of notice" severance pay
that is often seen in high-tech company policies, but rather a genu-
ine assessment of the loss the employee might suffer upon
termination.
Employers willing to pay for the unchallenged right to termi-
nate an employee may wish to negotiate liquidated damages or "ter-
mination pay" along with employee salary and benefits at the time
of employment in order to eliminate subsequent challenges. Such
action can serve as a type of "wrongful discharge self-insurance" for
employers. 34 Furthermore, with a set price on termination, the em-
ployer is likely to both hire and fire with sensitivity to the em-
ployee's right to compensation, and the employee is clearly warned
that termination may occur without cause.35
b. Calculation of the Payment
The employee in the Cox case discussed above, after 27 years
with the company, had accrued a right to severance pay for 27
weeks, a period which could be seen as a reasonable amount of time-
for finding new employment. The same employer's policy might
not have been determined to be reasonable for an employee of only
a few years' tenure. Predetermined severance policies are not as
likely to address the equities of a particular employee's situation as
are termination pay provisions negotiated with each individual em-
ployee. In the latter situation, the employee is an active participant
in the process and can choose other employment if the termination
pay, like the salary, is unsatisfactory. In that case, a subsequent
claim of unfairness by the employee is less viable.
One means of calculating a fair discharge payment is described
in Professor Prince's proposal for a statutory alternative to wrong-
32. 638 F. Supp. 726 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
33. Id. at 738, n.12.





ful discharge. 6 His proposed statute avoids the question of "just"
versus "wrongful" discharge altogether by establishing a "no-
cause" discharge option for employers and employees. This would
allow the employer to terminate the employee without cause upon
payment of a statutorily calculated discharge payment. 7 The dis-
charge payment increases as the age, tenure, and salary of the em-
ployee increases. The amount arrived at is then reduced by 20% if
the employer has written documentation of the employee's poor
performance and warnings related to that same performance.
A formulated amount, suggested in the above proposal, could
be partially set at the time of employment based on age and level of
position, with variables of tenure and employment record calculated
at termination. Alternatively, the employer may choose to establish
the exact termination amount at the time of employment, but retain
the option of paying nothing where the employee is terminated for
exceptionally good cause, such as that level of cause defined in La-
bor Code § 2924.8
Determining the base amount of the payment, taking both par-
ties' interests into account, might start with a realistic estimate of
the time necessary for the employee to find new employment. Exec-
utive search firms, which often provide testimony on this subject in
wrongful discharge litigation, could be a source of such informa-
tion. Settlements from non-litigated employment claims in the
high-tech arena might also be helpful. Such settlements are gener-
ally estimated to be in the range of six to twelve months salary for
vice president's and chief executive officer's levels and two to six
months for lower level employees.
c. Employee Claims Which May Still Survive
Employers' use of liquidated damages clauses in employment
contracts may not resolve all potential employee claims. The ag-
grieved employee, depending upon the circumstances, might be able
to make out a defamation action or a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. In addition, the terminated employee could
argue that termination pay clauses are unconscionable, or attack the
contract on the basis of adhesion due to the unequel bargaining po-
sition between the employer and potential employee.39 Further-
36. Prince III, A Modest Proposak The Statutory No-Cause Alternative to Wrongful
Discharge in California, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137 (1987).
37. Id.
38. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2924 which requires a high level of cause. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
39. Sharp, Preventing Wrongful Discharge, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 185, 195 (1985).
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more, the employee could argue that it is against public policy to
limit the employee's right to bring an action for breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The employee may also argue
that he bargained not simply for money when entering into an em-
ployment contract, but also for the opportunity to be employed, and
the experience, prestige and good will associated with being an em-
ployee of the company. When considered in this light, termination
pay may not be considered full compensation for the employee who
suffers the mental distress of being fired and the stigma of
unemployment.
The employer's rebuttal to such claims would focus on the em-
ployee's full participation in negotiating the termination pay and
the employee's opportunity to anticipate an amount that would rea-
sonably cover any of the number of predictable eventualities which
follow discharge. The employer's position would be strengthened
where the employer has encouraged the employee to seek legal con-
sultation and recorded that fact in the contract. If an employer and
employee have bargained for and agreed upon a fair and reasonable
price for termination in the employment contract, the timely paying
of such compensation at termination is at least presumptive of good
faith and may protect the employer from any further liability.
d. Inclusion of a Mandatory Arbitration Clause in
the Employment Contract
A written employment contract provides the employer with an
opportunity to consider the inclusion of a provision for mandatory
and binding arbitration of disputes relating to the employment rela-
tionship, thereby avoiding the "perils of jury assessment."'  Such
an arbitration provision can require that disputes be decided by
neutral arbitrators chosen by the parties themselves rather than by
persons chosen from the jury pool. Arbitration may result in a
speedier and more private means of resolving a dispute with the
employee, without the protracted discovery employer defendants
often face in litigation.
Courts tend to strictly enforce agreements to arbitrate in the
absence of a showing "that arbitration would be contrary to the
reasonable expectations of any party or that any loss or unfair im-
40. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W. 2d 880, 897
(Mich. 1980), the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the employer can avoid the perils of
jury assessment by providing for an alternative method of dispute resolution, such as binding
arbitration, in a written agreement.
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position would result."41 Section 1281.2 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure states that a court must issue an order compelling
arbitration of a controversy brought into court once it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.42
The desirability of arbitration can be seen in its introduction
into recent employment legislation. In Montana, for example, the
state legislature, in drafting a comprehensive wrongful discharge
statute, included mandatory arbitration along with other provisions
in attempting to balance employer-employee interests.43
Binding arbitration, though frequently desirable for employers,
is not without its drawbacks. Arbitration may make it easier for
employees to attack employer decisions and thus increase the
number of complaints and challenges. Moreover, arbitration may
result in the employer being assessed substantial damages without
the fuller investigative discovery and hearing processes which ac-
company traditional court litigation. Finally, an arbitration deci-
sion is appealable only on limited grounds' and appeal is a right
more likely to be exercised by an employer than an employee with
lesser resources. Nonetheless, these potential drawbacks aside,
most employers will find arbitration more amenable to their inter-
ests than jury trial.
V. MEASURES THE EMPLOYER CAN ADOPT AT THE
TIME OF TERMINATION
A. Handling the Termination Process
For many employers, wrongful discharge litigation will be no
41. See Frame v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668,
672, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971).
42. The court of appeal underscored the mandatory nature of California's arbitration
statute in its holding in Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Continental Nut Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 351, 270
P.2d 43 (1954), wherein it stated:
Where parties have agreed to arbitrate their differences it is clear intent of the
California arbitration statute that the courts should enforce the performance of
that agreement and when, notwithstanding the agreement, suit has been fied,
the statute specially enjoins the court, if the defendant seeks to claim the right
to arbitrate, to stay the court action until arbitration has been
accomplished....
Id. at 358. See also Bos Material Handling, Inc. v. Crown Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App. 3d
99, 186 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982).
43. MONT. CODE ANN., § 39-9.
44. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1286.2 (Deering 1981), provides that an arbitrator's
award can be appealed only where it was obtained through corruption, fraud or other undue
means, where there was corruption on the part of any of the arbitrators, where the rights of
a party were substantially prejudiced by an arbitrator's misconduct, or where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers or otherwise acted contrary to their statutory mandate.
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more than a vague concern until the eve of a termination. The em-
ployer, initially convinced to a moral certainty of the necessity of
the termination, will soon discover that the employee is well versed
as to his ability to contest a discharge and will become concerned.
What can an employer do when faced with an implied contract that
the employee will be treated fairly and discharged only for good
cause, when no prior risk avoidance measures have been taken, no
written contract exists and when there is a dearth of objective evi-
dence of fairness in the form of critical performance evaluations or
warnings that termination was likely?
The advice likely to be given to the employer under these cir-
cumstances is that which the employer is loathe to hear: wait.
Wait to allow the employee a genuine opportunity to improve his
performance after being notified specifically of the deficiencies and
the improvement expected. Wait until he has written documenta-
tion that could be shown to a jury, in the event of a wrongful dis-
charge action, evidencing fairness in giving the employee an
opportunity to improve his performance before a termination came
"out of the blue." Check the personnel fie to see if there are glow-
ing reviews or promises of promotions or salary increases. All of
these are viewed as reasonable bases for an employee's expectation
of continued employment. Wait to assess, with the standards
utililized by the courts, whether there exists demonstratable good
cause for the termination, or whether other factors tend to make the
stated cause appear pretextual. And wait until tempers have cooled
and the termination can be conducted in a calm and civil manner.
This will help reduce the occurence of claims of infliction of emo-
tional distress, defamation, and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
Most important to the termination process is the assessment of
good cause: whether it exists and whether it can be proven when
viewed by third parties more sympathetic to the employee. "Good
cause" can be defined in the employer's own policies, but care must
be taken that the policies are followed and applied evenhandedly.45
If so, the employer adhering to its own express policies in the termi-
nation has a better chance of being seen as fair. Most terminations,
though, will not fit neatly into a predefined category. The categories
themselves, such as "poor performance," might be too broad to be
of real use.
45. See Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241,
248, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984), wherein the employer was found to have specifically treated
its male and female employees differently in the application of the policy.
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Even though cause may be defined in company policies or in
the employment contract, the employer should also look for gui-
dance to the definitions of "good cause" used recently by the courts.
One such example is "a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated
by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power."" An-
other articulation of "good cause" is balancing the employer's inter-
est in operating the business efficiently and profitably, the
employee's interest in maintaining his employment, and the public's
interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two.47 Both
definitions, because of the references to good faith and the balancing
of interests, indicate the employer's loss of sole control in the termi-
nation process.
Although courts have recognized that they should not interfere
with the legitimate exercise of managerial discretion and subjective
judgment, especially where the employee occupies a sensitive mana-
gerial position,48 employers may find that their subjective judgment
will be tested severely by a jury with less understanding of the need
for managerial discretion than management itself. Nonetheless, ex-
ecutives, managers, supervisors, and creative employees will usually
be evaluated by considerations, such as maturity, leadership ability,
tact, confidence, style, and loyalty, that defy definition or compari-
son, particularly in a small company.
Judicial recognition of the need for managerial discretion is
found most predictably in cases where such discretion is used to
effect layoffs based on bona fide economic concerns. Layoffs are
given much protection by the courts and as long as the employer
can show a genuine economic need for the layoff, their terminations
will likely be upheld and no duty found requiring the employer to
protect the employee's economic interests over those of the com-
pany.49 Employers would weaken their position, however, by filling
the spot once occupied by the undesirable employee or by claiming
46. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
47. Crosier v. United Parcel, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1139, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983).
48. Pugh v. See's Candies Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d at 330, accord, Percivel v. General
Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976). But see, Crosier v. United Parcel, 150
Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1140, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983), where the court rejected the employer's
request to preclude review of its business judgment that violation of the employer's rule
against fraternization among employees constituted cause, although the court did defer to the
employer's judgment about when the rule should be applied.
49. Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985);
Clutterham v. Coachmen Industry, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1223, 1227, 215 Cal. Rptr. 795
(1985). In the latter case the employee's argument that the employer "had a duty to consider
the employee's economic interests and to try to preserve his job if possible" was rejected. Id
at 1228. See also, Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1985).
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economic necessity as a justification for removing an employee that
the company had wished to terminate for other reasons. Arguing
economic necessity will not assist the employer where a discrimina-
tory pattern is found in the layoffs, such as where all persons termi-
nated are of a particular sex, race, or age, or where discriminatory
reasons motivated the choice of one employee over another.
If no layoff results from an assessment of whether an em-
ployee's poor performance constitutes adequate cause to justify ter-
mination, employers might look to proven methods employed in the
labor context. Arbitrators involved in union wrongful discharge ac-
tions against management have dealt with the problem of the deter-
mination of the existence of just cause for a long time. Arbitrator
Carroll R. Daugherty has reduced the basic elements of the just
cause determination to seven factors.5 0 A "no" answer to one or
more of the following seven questions indicates that just cause was
not satisfied by the employer or that a discriminatory or arbitrary
element was present.
1. Notice: Did the employer give the employee forewarn-
ing of the possible or probable consequences of the employee's
conduct?
2. Reasonable rule or order: Were the employer's rules or
orders reasonably related to the operation of the business and to
the performance that the employer might properly expect of the
employee?51
3. Investigation: Did the employer before terminating the
employee make an effort to discover whether the employee did in
fact violate a rule or order of management?
4. Fair investigation: Was the employer's investigation
conducted fairly and objectively?
5. Proof: At the investigation, did the employer obtain
substantial evidence that the employee was "guilty" as charged?
6. Equal treatment: Has the employer applied its rules,
orders and penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination to
all employees?
7. Penalty: Was the degree of discipline administered by
the employer reasonably related to the seriousness of the em-
ployee's proven offense and the record of the employee?52
Another perspective on the cause issue is the situation where
the employer is acting for an honest and legitimate business reason,
50. KOVEN & SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTs (1985).
51. See Tousaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W. 2d 880 (Mich.
1980).
52. KOVEN & SMrrH, at 10.
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but the belief in such is found to be mistaken. The courts have
generally found for the employer in these situations, holding that if
there is (1) a legitimate business interest for the employee's termina-
tion and (2) good faith reliance thereon, a mistake in the determina-
tion will not be actionable against the employer.53
On their face the above standards appear to grant wide latitude
to employers. The difficulty with poorly performing employees is
that the judgment call is often wholly subjective and thus subject to
varying interpretations. The most objective good cause determina-
tion will still be suspect if an unfair motive is found to be at the
heart of the decision. Is the employee in a minority group or over
age 40? Is the employee on the eve of vesting valuable stock rights?
Has the employee recently returned from lengthy jury duty, or ma-
ternity, disability or sick leave? Has the employee complained
about an unfair or illegal business practice?5 4 An affirmative an-
swer to any these questions may make the employer's decision re-
garding the quality of the discharged employee's performance, no
matter how well founded in cause, appear pretextual.
Finally, after the analysis is complete and the employer re-
mains convinced that the employee's poor performance will be
judged accordingly, the employer should consider whether an alter-
native, short of termination, can be offered to the employee. This
might include another position in the company or continued em-
ployment until a replacement is found or the employee locates an-
other position. This practice, at little cost to the employer, may
significantly reduce the employee's chances of a successful claim for
damages and place the employer in a favorable light.
B. Entering into a Release with the Employee
Employers often ask whether it is advisable to have employees
sign written releases at the time of termination, especially where
severance pay or some other type of consideration beyond that
which the employer is required to give under its policies is offered.
At one time employers were reluctant to present a release to the
employee for fear it would encourage the employee to consider his
legal rights. Recently, however, in light of considerable publicity
about employee rights, most employees, particularly upper-level
53. LaGoe v. Duber Indus. Sec., Inc., 194 Cal. App. 3d 349, 354, 239 Cal. Rptr. 445
(1987). Summary judgment for employer was upheld on grounds that employer's investiga-
tion of theft allegations and subsequent discharge of employee were reasonable.
54. See eg., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (Deering 1984), barring employer action against
an employee who discloses statutory violations to a government agency.
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employees with whom the employer has negotiated a severance
package, are likely to consider their legal rights regardless of
whether the employer protects itself with a written release.
A well-drafted release is the employer's best tool for avoiding
subsequent litigation of the issues. Utilization of such a release en-
sures that the employer will not end up in the position of having
made a severence payment to buy the discharged employee's good
will and face a lawsuit for wrongful discharge as well.
Clearly the employee is under no obligation to sign a release.
Where the release proffered by an employer provides the employee
nothing beyond that which he is entitled by law, such as unused
vacation pay, or non-defamatory references, the employee may
rightfully refuse to sign it. It is unlikely that such a release, which
is effectively without consideration, would be upheld.
Like all contracts, a release should be entered into by the par-
ties knowingingly and voluntarily. The employee should have the
opportunity to negotiate regarding the terms, it shotild be written in
plain English, and should clearly spell out the consequences. The
employee should be advised to consult an attorney and must be
given ample deliberation time.55 The courts have generally held
that uncoerced releases will be upheld so long as they are suffi-
ciently specific and obtained without harassment or misleading cir-
cumstances.56 Specificity is important, especially where release of
statutory claims is expected-the obvious goal of an employer seek-
ing to remove all potential of litigation. The statutes should be
named and the release made applicable to lawsuits and actions filed
with regulatory agencies.5 7
A recitation that the employer is not admitting liability of any
type by entering into the release is common to releases and has long
been thought to protect the settling parties from later claims of ad-
mission. A recent federal court decision, however, calls that con-
55. EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 34 Emp. Prac. Dec. §34,435 (W.D. Pa. 1984), which
dealt with an injunction to bar enforcement of a release of age discrimination claims in the
absence of these factors. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-17).
See eg., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974).
56. Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 178 (1986), involving Age Act rights, which upheld a non-court supervised
release where there was a bona fide factal dispute and the release was a good faith compro-
mise of that dispute.
57. In EEOC v. Cosmair, 821 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1987), the employee signed a
release of age claims in exchange for severance benefits, which was seen as insufficient, with-
out specific language, to prevent the employee from filing EEOC charges. That is, the release




clusion into question. In Casino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.,"8 an
employee was offered $18,000 in severance pay to sign a release
agreement. The employee rejected the offer and subsequently won
$492,000 in an age discrimination lawsuit. The Casino court al-
lowed admission of the proposed release as evidence that the em-
ployer knew it was acting illegally in firing the employee thereby
distinguishing the release from a bona fide offer to settle made after
a lawsuit is filed, which cannot be used against the party making the
offer. The court further noted that such severance offers are inher-
ently coercive because of the employer's superior bargaining posi-
tion, especially in the context of termination.59
The Casino decision advises employers to use extreme care in
the presentation of releases. Unless the employee has formally
presented a claim through lawsuit or demand letter, or the em-
ployer is certain the employee will accept the offer presented in the
release, the employer should postpone the offer. Instead, the em-
ployer should pay what is required under existing policies and save
the settlement money until a settlement is necessary. The employer
should then make sure the offer has negotiating room to permit em-
ployee participation and encourage the 'employee to obtain legal
counsel. The written release itself should be broad and all-inclusive
and used by the employer in all settlement situations so that a refer-
ence to particular statutes and laws will not be considered a specific
admission that such a statute applies to the individual case at hand.
In addition to a release, the termination process should include
a written memorandum to the employee outlining the reasons for
discharge, offering assistance to the employee in reemployment ef-
forts, and, where appropriate, a mutually agreed upon letter of rec-
ommendation. The goal is to leave the employee in the best frame
of mind possible under the circumstances and to assist the employee
in finding new employment to reduce the potential damages the em-
ployee may suffer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The employers' legal difficulties in the termination of poor per-
formers stem from the imposition by courts of implied contract
terms, which were probably never contemplated by employers ac-
customed to free rein in the management of their businesses. Using
those court findings to their advantage, employers can take contract
58. 817 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1987).
59. Id. at 1343.
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matters into their own hands, consider the terms they want to see in
their arrangements with employees, and then negotiate those terms
openly and frankly. Both parties can then know what their rela-
tionship entails and act accordingly.
